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Understanding the observed arrow of time is equivalent, under general assumptions, to explaining why 
Boltzmann brains do not overwhelm ordinary observers. It is usually thought that this provides a 
condition on the decay rate of every cosmologically accessible de Sitter vacuum, and that this condition 
is determined by the production rate of Boltzmann brains calculated using semiclassical theory built on 
each such vacuum. We argue, based on a recently developed picture of microscopic quantum gravitational 
degrees of freedom, that this thinking needs to be modiﬁed. In particular, depending on the structure of 
the fundamental theory, the decay rate of a de Sitter vacuum may not have to satisfy any condition 
except for the one imposed by the Poincaré recurrence. The framework discussed here also addresses the 
question of whether a Minkowski vacuum may produce Boltzmann brains.
© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Funded by SCOAP3.1. Introduction
At ﬁrst sight, the fact that we observe that time ﬂows only 
in one direction may seem mysterious, given that the fundamen-
tal laws of physics are invariant under reversing the orientation 
of time.1 Upon careful consideration, however, one notices that 
the problem is not the unidirectional nature per se. As discussed 
in Refs. [1,2], given any ﬁnal state | f 〉 whose coarse-grained en-
tropy is lower than the initial state |i〉, the evolution history is 
overwhelmingly dominated by the CPT conjugate of the standard 
(entropy increasing) process | f¯ 〉 → |ı¯〉. This implies that a physi-
cal observer, who is necessarily a part of the whole system, sees 
virtually always, i.e. with an overwhelmingly high probability, that 
time ﬂows from the “past” (in which correlations of the observer 
with the rest of the system are smaller) to the “future” (in which 
the correlations are larger).
The problem of the arrow of time, therefore, is not to under-
stand its unidirectional nature, but to explain why physical predic-
tions are (probabilistically) dominated by what we observe in our 
* Correspondence to: Berkeley Center for Theoretical Physics, Department of 
Physics, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA.
E-mail address: ynomura@berkeley.edu.
1 The operation discussed here is not what is called the time reversal T in quan-
tum ﬁeld theory, which we know is broken in nature. It corresponds to CPT in the 
standard language of quantum ﬁeld theory.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.physletb.2015.08.029
0370-2693/© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article 
SCOAP3.universe, i.e. a ﬂow from a very low coarse-grained entropy state 
to a slightly higher entropy state. In particular, it requires the un-
derstanding of the following facts:
• At least one set of states representing our observations, which 
are mutually related by time evolution spanning the obser-
vation time, are realized in the quantum state representing 
the whole universe/multiverse. (Here and below we adopt the 
Schrödinger picture.) This is the case despite the fact that 
these states have very low coarse-grained entropies.2
• The answer to a physical question, which may always be asked 
in the form of a conditional probability [6], must be deter-
mined by the class of low coarse-grained entropy states de-
scribed above. In particular, the probability should not (always) 
be dominated by the states in which the unconditioned part of 
the system has the highest coarse-grained entropies.
2 Because of the Hamiltonian constraint, the full universe/multiverse state is ex-
pected to be static, i.e. not to depend on any time parameter [3,4]. We may, how-
ever, talk about effective time evolution if we focus on branches of the whole 
universe/multiverse state, since they are not (necessarily) invariant under the ac-
tion of the time evolution operator e−iHτ . This is the picture we adopt in this 
paper. Note that this time evolution still does not have to be the same as “phys-
ical time evolution” deﬁned through correlations among physical subsystems, e.g., 
as in Ref. [5]. In the static-state picture, the statement here is phrased such that the 
state of the universe/multiverse contains components representing our observations 
despite the fact that they are not generic in the relevant Hilbert space.under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Funded by 
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brain problem [7,8]. The problem of the arrow of time is thus 
equivalent to the Boltzmann brain problem [4] under (rather gen-
eral) assumptions that went into the line of argument given above.
Any realistic cosmology must accommodate the two facts listed 
above. Is it trivial to do so? In a seminal paper [7], Dyson, Kle-
ban, and Susskind pointed out that it is not. In particular, they 
considered a de Sitter vacuum representing our own universe and 
argued that if it lives long enough, thermal ﬂuctuations in de Sit-
ter space lead to Boltzmann brains observing chaotic worlds, who 
overwhelm ordinary, ordered observers like us. If true, this would 
give an upper bound on the lifetime of our universe which is much 
stronger than that needed to avoid the Poincaré recurrence (bar-
ring the possibility that the observed vacuum energy relaxes into 
a zero or negative value in the future). In this paper we argue 
that this consideration needs to be modiﬁed, based on the picture 
of the microscopic structure of quantum gravity advanced recently 
[9] to address the black hole information problem [10,11]. We dis-
cuss implications of this modiﬁcation for our own universe and the 
eternally inﬂating multiverse. We also discuss implications of the 
framework for the possibility [12] of Boltzmann brain production 
in a Minkowski vacuum.
2. de Sitter space in quantum gravity
We ﬁrst extend the discussion of Ref. [9], which mainly focused 
on a system with a black hole, to de Sitter space. In cosmology, 
de Sitter space appears as a meta-stable state in the middle of the 
evolution of the universe/multiverse, and in this sense it is simi-
lar to a spacetime with a dynamically formed black hole. Indeed, 
string theory suggests that there is no absolutely stable de Sit-
ter vacuum in full quantum gravity; it must decay, at least, before 
the Poincaré recurrence time [13]. This implies that what we call 
de Sitter space cannot be an eigenstate of energy (at least in this 
context).
Consider a semiclassical de Sitter space with Hubble radius α. 
(We focus on 4-dimensional spacetime for simplicity, but the ex-
tension to other dimensions is straightforward.) Following the 
complementarity hypothesis [14], and in particular its implemen-
tation in Refs. [2,6], we adopt a “local description,” in which 
quantum states represent physical conﬁgurations on equal-time 
hypersurfaces foliating the causal patch associated with a freely 
falling frame. We assume that the timescale for the evolution of 
microstates representing the de Sitter space is of order Δt ≈ α, 
where t is the proper time measured at the spatial origin, p0, of 
the reference frame. The uncertainty principle then implies that a 
state representing this space must involve a superposition of en-
ergy eigenstates with a spread of order ΔE ≈ 1/α. Associating this 
energy with the vacuum energy density ρ integrated over the 
Hubble volume, E ≈ O (ρα3) ≈ O (α/l2P), this spread is translated 
into Δα ≈ O (l2P/α), where lP is the Planck length.
How many different independent ways are there to superpose 
the energy eigenstates to arrive at the semiclassical de Sitter space 








gives the logarithm of this number (at the leading order in ex-
pansion in inverse powers of A/l2P), where A = 4πα2 is the area 
of the de Sitter horizon [16]. In particular, there are exponen-
tially many independent de Sitter vacuum states—the states that 
do not have a ﬁeld or string theoretic excitation in the semiclassi-
cal background—which all represent the same de Sitter vacuum at 
the semiclassical level.The analysis of physics in this de Sitter vacuum is parallel to 
that on a black hole background in Ref. [9]. Denoting the index 
representing the exponentially many de Sitter vacuum states by
k = 1, . . . , eS0 , (2)
where |S0 − SGH| ≈ O (Aq/l2qP ; q < 1), states at late times on this 
vacuum can be expanded in terms of the microstates of the form
|a¯a;k(α)〉. (3)
Here, a¯ and a label excitations of the stretched horizon, located at 
r = α − O (l2P/α) ≡ rs, and the interior region, r < rs, respectively, 
where r is the static radial coordinate with r = 0 taken at p0. Note 
that excitations here are deﬁned as ﬂuctuations with respect to 
a ﬁxed background, so their energies as well as entropies can be 
either positive or negative, although their signs must be the same. 
The contribution of the excitations to the entropy is subdominant 
in the l2P/A expansion, so that the total entropy of this de Sitter 
system (not necessarily of the vacuum states) is still given by S =
A/4l2P at the leading order.
The indices for the excitations, a¯ and a, and the vacuum, k, do 
not fully “decouple”. In particular, operators in the semiclassical 
theory representing modes whose energies deﬁned at r = 0 are
ω TGH, (4)
act nontrivially on both a and k indices, where TGH = 1/2πα is the 
Gibbons–Hawking temperature. This allows us to understand the 
thermal nature of the semiclassical de Sitter space in the following 
manner. The fact that all the independent microstates with differ-
ent k lead to the same geometry (within the quantum mechanical 
uncertainty) suggests that the semiclassical picture is obtained af-
ter coarse-graining the degrees of freedom represented by this 
index, which we call the vacuum degrees of freedom. In this picture, 
the de Sitter vacuum in the semiclassical description is represented 






To obtain the response of this state to the operators in the semi-
classical theory, we may trace out the subsystem C¯ on which they 
do not act. Consistently with our identiﬁcation of the origin of the 
Gibbons–Hawking entropy, we identify the resulting reduced den-
sity matrix as the thermal density matrix




− Hsc(α)TGH , (6)
where Z = Tr e−Hsc(α)/TGH , and Hsc(α) is the Hamiltonian of the 
semiclassical theory.
Another manifestation of the non-decoupling nature of the a
and k indices is that for states having a negative energy excitation, 
the range over which k runs is smaller than that in Eq. (2)—this 
is the meaning that a negative energy excitation carries a negative 
entropy. As discussed in the next section, this fact is important 
in ensuring unitarity in the process in which a physical detector 
held at constant r is excited due to interactions with the de Sitter 
spacetime.
3. Vacuum degrees of freedom
The expression in Eq. (6) implies that the spatial distribution of 
the information in k follows the thermal entropy calculated using 
the local temperature
516 Y. Nomura / Physics Letters B 749 (2015) 514–518T (r) = 1
2πα
1√
1− ( rα )2
. (7)
Namely, the vacuum degrees of freedom can be viewed (in a given 
quasi-static reference frame) as being distributed according to the 
thermal entropy calculated using T (r) in the semiclassical theory. 
Since the thermal nature is the crucial element in the argument 
of Boltzmann brains, we must ask: what is the dynamics of the 
vacuum degrees of freedom?
In Ref. [9], I have argued, together with Sanches and Weinberg, 
that the thermal nature of semiclassical theory should not be taken 
“too literally.” Speciﬁcally, it does not mean that the degrees of 
freedom described within the semiclassical theory are actually in 
thermal equilibrium with local temperature T (r). Rather, the ther-
mal nature implies that the vacuum degrees of freedom—which are 
already coarse-grained to obtain the semiclassical theory—interact 
with the excitations in the semiclassical theory—e.g. a detector lo-
cated in de Sitter space—as if these excitations are immersed in 
the thermal bath of temperature T (r). In particular, the dynamics 
of the vacuum degrees of freedom themselves cannot be described 
by the semiclassical Hamiltonian Hsc(α). These degrees of freedom 
are neither matter nor spacetime; they are “some stuff” that reveal 
either feature of matter or spacetime depending on the question 
one asks—the phenomenon we referred to as spacetime-matter du-
ality.3
To elucidate this point further, let us consider a physical detec-
tor held at some constant r = rd. (For rd = 0, this is an accelerating 
detector.) The detector then responds as if it is immersed in the 
thermal bath of temperature T (rd), and correspondingly extracts 
information from the vacuum degrees of freedom k. It need not, 
and in fact does not, imply that the semiclassical degrees of free-
dom are actually in thermal equilibrium with the temperature in 
Eq. (7). Due to energy conservation, this response is accompanied 
by a creation of a negative energy excitation, which propagates (or 
free-falls) toward larger r and collides with the stretched horizon. 
The background spacetime will then eventually relax into the one 
whose horizon area is (slightly) smaller, reﬂecting the existence of 
the detector with a higher energy. This whole process is depicted 
schematically in Fig. 1. Note that because the negative energy ex-
citation has a negative entropy, each step in the process can be 
separately unitary. For more details, see the discussion on the anal-
ogous process of black hole mining in Ref. [9].
The second process we consider is the Hawking–Moss transi-
tion [17] from a de Sitter vacuum to another vacuum. As discussed, 
e.g., in Ref. [18], this transition can be viewed as a thermal process 
occurring through a ﬁeld climbing up the potential barrier sepa-
rating the two vacua. In our picture, this interpretation becomes 
valid only in the context of a theory built on the daughter vacuum 
to which the original vacuum decays. In particular, the existence 
of the transition does not imply that the semiclassical degrees of 
freedom built on the original de Sitter vacuum were actually in 
thermal equilibrium with Eq. (7) before the transition.
The two examples above illustrate that the thermal nature of 
spacetime acquires a clear semiclassical interpretation only in the 
context of the vacuum degrees of freedom interacting with other 
degrees of freedom, either semiclassical excitations (e.g. when a 
physical detector exists) or another system beyond the one built 
on the vacuum degrees of freedom themselves (e.g. when the vac-
uum decays). In the case of a black hole, the former corresponds to 
the situation in black hole mining, while the latter to spontaneous 
3 This situation reminds us of wave–particle duality, which played an important 
role in early days in the development of quantum mechanics—a quantum object 
exhibited dual properties of waves and particles, while the “true” (quantum) de-
scription did not fundamentally rely on either of these classical concepts.Fig. 1. A schematic depiction of the process in which a detector located in de Sit-
ter space interacts with the spacetime; time ﬂows from the top to the bottom. The 
detector initially in some state (unﬁlled dot in the top panel) will react to the local 
Gibbons–Hawking temperature (ﬁlled dot in the middle panel). This is accompa-
nied by the creation of a negative energy excitation, which has a negative entropy 
and propagates to the stretched horizon (dashed arrow in the middle panel). The 
background system then eventually relaxes into a new space whose horizon area is 
smaller than the original one (the bottom panel).
Hawking emission in which the far exterior region (outside the 
“zone”) serves as the other system [9]. We note that the picture 
described here does not affect the standard calculation of density 
ﬂuctuations in an inﬂationary universe [19], since these ﬂuctua-
tions are interpreted in a late-time universe with much smaller 
vacuum energy (analogous to the case of a vacuum decay).
4. Boltzmann brains
Consider a de Sitter vacuum J with Hubble radius α J . What 
are the conditions that its decay rate 
 J must satisfy? If the fun-
damental theory does not have a stable de Sitter vacuum, as sug-
gested by string theory, then the vacuum must decay before the 






Since the Gibbons–Hawking entropy is obtained under the (im-
plicit) assumption that the dynamics of the degrees of freedom 
it represents takes a local form, it is appropriate to use for trec, J
the expression for the classical Poincaré recurrence time
trec, J ∼ α J eSGH, J , (9)
where SGH, J = πα2J /l2P. Note that this does not necessarily mean 
that the dynamics of the vacuum degrees of freedom is local in the 
original de Sitter space. It only implies that, assuming the vacuum 
degrees of freedom indeed comprise O (SGH) quantum degrees of 
freedom, their dynamics can be organized to take a local form in 
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special nearest-neighbor form in this space.4
Another requirement for 
 J is that Boltzmann brains do not 








where n J and 
BB, J are, respectively, the number of ordinary ob-
servers and the rate of producing Boltzmann brains, both counted 
with a common rule in the spacetime region causally accessible 
from p0. Given how the universe enters into J , n J can be com-
puted (in principle) using semiclassical theory built on J . The 
question is: how to calculate, or estimate, 
BB, J ?
Traditionally, 
BB, J has been estimated using the semiclassical 
theory built on J with the assumption that the degrees of freedom 
in the theory are in thermal equilibrium with the Gibbons–Hawking 
temperature [7,20–22]. In our picture, however, it is the internal 
dynamics of the vacuum degrees of freedom that is relevant for 
the production of Boltzmann brains, which—as we have argued 
in Section 3—cannot be captured by the semiclassical Hamiltonian 
Hsc, J .5 In fact, we may expect that this dynamics is very differ-
ent from that given by Hsc, J . (Note that if the two were identical, 
it would reintroduce the ﬁrewall problem of Ref. [11].) In particu-
lar, we know that n J is nonvanishing in the vacuum representing 
our universe, but this does not mean that the internal dynamics 
of the corresponding vacuum degrees of freedom (which we do 
not know yet) must produce intellectual observers. If this dynam-
ics does not support any intellectual observer, then the timescale 
for Boltzmann brain production need not be much shorter than 
the Poincaré recurrence time, i.e. the timescale in which the vac-
uum spontaneously creates semiclassical excitations with signiﬁ-
cant probabilities. The decay rate of our universe then need not be 
much larger than 1/trec, J , where trec, J is given by Eq. (9).
Now, suppose that the fundamental theory has a multitude of 
vacua, as suggested by string theory, and that it leads to the eter-
nally inﬂating multiverse. Under rather general assumptions about 
the dynamics of the multiverse, the conditions for avoiding Boltz-
mann brain dominance can be written as

 J  
BB, J , (11)
for all de Sitter vacua in the theory [22]. (The factors n J do not 
play a signiﬁcant role if the probability of producing ordinary ob-
servers in our universe is not double-exponentially suppressed, 
which seems to be the case.) In the traditional picture, this im-
poses a strong constraint on the decay rate of any de Sitter vacuum 
J supporting intelligent observers. In particular, it gives constraints 
on the decay rates of all the vacua that are similar to our own vac-
uum, which are much stronger than the ones needed to avoid the 
Poincaré recurrence. While there is a suggestion that these strong 
constraints may indeed be satisﬁed in (at least, a particular cor-
ner of) the string landscape [21], one might feel disconcerting that 
such a fundamental property as the fact that we can comprehend 
the world relies on “accidental,” numerical features of the theory. 
4 If the dynamics of O (SGH) degrees of freedom took a “fully ergodic” form in 
the sense that a generic initial state probes, as time passes, the entire Hilbert space 
without any “classicalization,” then trec, J would be given by the quantum Poincaré 
recurrence time, α J ee
SGH, J
.
5 We assume that the process of “consciousness” needed to characterize Boltz-
mann brains, as well as ordinary observers, is deﬁned by a set of states spanning 
the time for the process (not just by an instantaneous state), and thus depends on 
the Hamiltonian generating the time evolution.Our picture offers a much simpler possibility: the dynamics of the 
vacuum degrees of freedom may simply not support any intelligent 









and the conditions in Eq. (11) can be easily satisﬁed under the 
assumption in Eqs. (8), (9). We may say that “spacetime cannot 
think.”
We ﬁnally note that while some features appearing in the 
present framework look similar to those discussed in Ref. [23], the 
underlying physical pictures are different, so that the physical im-
plications of the two are also different. In the present picture, a 
semiclassical de Sitter vacuum is not an exact energy eigenstate 
and is subject to a nontrivial dynamics at the microscopic level 
(at least in cosmological contexts). The rate of Boltzmann brain 
production in such a vacuum then depends crucially on the (un-
known) microscopic dynamics of quantum gravity. This issue was 
not discussed in Ref. [23].
5. Summary and discussion
Assuming that the concept of consciousness is deﬁned physi-
cally (and that quantum mechanics provides a correct description 
of nature at the fundamental level), the fact that we observe an or-
dered, comprehensible world implies special structures of quantum 
operators characterizing our observations, which act on a Hilbert 
space in which the state representing the universe/multiverse lives. 
In particular, in the standard time-evolution picture, which arises 
from focusing on branches in the full universe/multiverse state, the 
decay rate of any de Sitter vacuum that is cosmologically popu-
lated must be larger than the production rate of Boltzmann brains, 
Eq. (11). Under certain weak assumptions on the dynamics of the 
multiverse, satisfying this condition is equivalent to explaining the 
origin of the arrow of time we observe in nature.
In this paper we have argued that, in contrast with the tradi-
tional view, the rate of Boltzmann brain production in a de Sitter 
vacuum cannot be calculated using the semiclassical theory built 
on this vacuum. It is determined, instead, by the (unknown) mi-
croscopic dynamics of the vacuum degrees of freedom, which is not 
the same as that of the usual semiclassical degrees of freedom de-
spite the fact that they provide the origin of the Gibbons–Hawking 
entropy (the phenomenon referred to as spacetime-matter duality 
in Ref. [9]). In particular, the fact that a physical detector located 
in the de Sitter space sees a thermal bath of temperature T (r) in 
Eq. (7) does not imply that the semiclassical degrees of freedom, 
whose dynamics is determined by the semiclassical Hamiltonian, 
are actually in thermal equilibrium with temperature T (r). It only 
implies the existence of some degrees of freedom—the vacuum 
degrees of freedom—which interact with semiclassical degrees of 
freedom as if they are a thermal bath of temperature T (r).
The picture of the microscopic structure of quantum gravity de-
scribed above offers a new possibility to avoid the dominance of 
Boltzmann brains—the dynamics of the vacuum degrees of free-
dom may simply not support any intelligent observers. The picture 
also addresses the question [12] of whether a Minkowski vacuum 
produces Boltzmann brains—it depends on the microscopic dynam-
ics of the vacuum degrees of freedom comprising that Minkowski 
vacuum. The fact that the Hawking temperature is zero in a 
Minkowski vacuum does not, by itself, guarantee the absence of 
Boltzmann brains; it simply means the absence of interactions be-
tween the semiclassical and vacuum degrees of freedom. Whether 
Boltzmann brains are produced in this vacuum then depends on 
518 Y. Nomura / Physics Letters B 749 (2015) 514–518the internal dynamics of the vacuum degrees of freedom, which is 
not yet known.
If the state of the universe/multiverse in fact probes a Minkow-
ski vacuum, or stays in a de Sitter vacuum supporting intelligent 
observers for a very long time, then the consideration in this pa-
per becomes relevant. It is intriguing that such a basic fact that we 
observe an ordered, comprehensible world may deeply rely on the 
structure of quantum gravity at the fundamental level.
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